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Abstract: The paper analyses current versions of top three used Internet browsers and compare their security 
levels to a research done in 2006. The security is measured by analyzing how user data is stored. Data recorded 
during different browsing sessions and by different password management functions it is considered sensitive 
data. The paper describes how the browser protects the sensitive data and how an attacker or a forensic analyst 
can access it. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Accordingly with browser market share, 
[1], the top three used browsers are 
Microsoft Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox 
and Google Chrome.   
 
 
Figure 1. Browser market share, Q3 2010 
 
The paper analyses current versions of top 
three Internet browsers and compare their 
security levels to the one described in a 
2006 paper, [2] Password Management 
Concerns with IE and Firefox that analyzed 
Microsoft IE 6 and 7 and Firefox p1.5 and 
2.0. In that research, the author defined 
and analyzed password storage 
mechanisms, attacks on password 
managers, the false sense of security, 
usability and the mitigation and 
countermeasures. 
Most of the time, the entire security 
framework of the personal computer is 
based on the user management routines 
implemented by the operating system. 
Many home users base their computer 
security on user accounts to protect 
against physical or remote access to the 
machine. This is a dangerous and 
deprecated opinion because today IT 
security threats use the Internet and the 
user is more vulnerable when surfing or 
using Web services than not being at the 
computer. Users access more and more 
Web services, like social networking, 
Internet banking, online shopping and 
gaming that require sensitive personal 
data. And, the Web gate to all these 
resources is represented by the Web 
browser used to access the pages. 
Today browsers have become complex 
software applications. It allows users to do 
more than just viewing web pages, adding 
up to their usability level through many 
other functions. One of these functions is 
to manage user passwords for different 
sites. The need for this option come from 
the fact that Web developers implement in 
their applications secure sessions that 
require users to authenticate with their 
username and password. And this is a 
reality for almost any type of Website, 
from a forum to an e-commerce one. So 
users must manage a set of multiple 
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credentials used to authenticate on 
different websites. 
 
As almost all users won’t memorize 
multiple long and hard-to-guess passwords 
or write them on paper, the solutions that 
they may adopt are: 
 use same password for multiple sites 
or applications; 
 use password managers to store 
sensitive data. 
 
The first solution is to be avoided because 
a single piece of information, represented 
by the used password, becomes the most 
vulnerable point of the personal data 
system, [2]. Acquiring that, an attacker 
will have access to all the Websites, e-
mail, FTP accounts and other online 
services.  
 
In Internet there are four primary ways 
users lose control over their web-based 
passwords, [15]: 
 Phishing Scams – through fake 
websites or emails the attacker ask 
users to send him sensitive data like 
bank accounts, card PINs, passwords;  
 Malware – users are convinced by the 
attacker to install malicious software, 
to access bad links and to allow 
malware to install on its machine 
through its browser; the malware can 
be a simple java script like a booklet 
password [20] or a more advanced 
third party software. 
 
javascript:(function() { 
var s,j,form,i; pass = "";  
for(j=0; j<document.forms.length; ++j) { 
form = document.forms[j];  
 for (i=0; i<form.length; ++i) {  
if (form[i].type.toLowerCase() == "password")  
  pass += form[i].value + "\n";}}  
if (pass) alert("Passwords on this page:\n\n" + pass);  
else alert("There are no passwords in forms on this page."); 
})(); 
Figure 2. Booklet that shows the content of password fields 
 
 Website break-ins – the attacker 
succeeds to break the website security 
by SQL Injection, Remote File Inclusion 
(RFI), Cross Site Scripting (XSS), [13-
14] or any other security vulnerability 
or misconfiguration and he manages to 
gain sensitive data or even to modify 
pages content in order to control users; 
 Website brute-force attacks – the 
attacker breaks users’ authentication 
credentials by trying possible 
passwords as in dictionary attacks. 
 
The first two attacks and the XSS are 
strong related to browsers because they 
are based on scenarios in which the user 
uses the browser to open a fake webpage 
or to install malicious code. Using the 
browser is created a direct connection 
between users and attackers. 
Because, it is possible for someone to gain 
full control from the Internet to the target 
machine, all possible attacks that can be 
conducted directly on the machine can also 
be used by the remote attacker.  
 
2. Browsers sensitive data 
 
The tight competition in the browsers 
market has motivated developers to offer 
more than a tool for just viewing Web 
pages. The quality of this type of software 
application can be analyzed from the 
viewpoint of these ISO 9126, [24], 
characteristics: 
 efficiency measured as virtual memory 
needed to run the application and as 
speed in opening full downloaded Web 
pages; 
 usability that describes how easy is to 
understand it and use it; 
 functionality  that defines the set of 
implemented functions; 
The last two characteristics are 
materialized by including different tools 
and functions that help users to do with 
ease tasks as completing Web forms, 
creating secure connections, managing 
Web pages, debugging. All these 
advantages reduce the user effort to 
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remember passwords, Web pages 
addresses and to complete Web forms with 
personal data, but also generate security 
vulnerabilities.  
Data saved and managed by browsers is 
considered sensitive because contains: 
 Autocomplete form data that 
represents phone numbers, addresses, 
user names, emails; 
 Browsing history collecting previous 
visited URLs that describes a personal 
experience regarding what are the 
users informational needs; 
 Bookmarks representing favorites 
links; 
 Autocomplete passwords that give 
access to restricted Web resources and 
services; 
 Passwords for FTP sites 
 
3. Firefox security 
 
From the 3.5 version, Mozilla Firefox, 
stores passwords in two different files, [3-
5],  
 key3.db, a binary file with a database 
table format, that stores the master 
key, the master password [28], for the 
passwords database; information in 
this files describes encrypted string, 
salt, algorithm and version 
information; 
 signons.sqlite, a binary file with a 
SQLite format, [3], that stores the 
password and the username saved for 
different sites;  the .sqlite file 
represents a complete SQL database 
being a cross-platform portable 
solution and this allow open access to 
the database structure; the database 
contains two tables, 
moz_disabledHosts used to store the 
URL of websites for which users have 
disable the password save function and 
moz_logins used to store passwords;  
 
Figure 3 describes the process of 
encrypting and decrypting the passwords 
by Firefox in 3 steps: 
1. The user access the Web page that 
uses a HTML authentication form; 
2. After authentication, if the user 
chooses to save the password and 
username, Firefox stores the page URL, 
in clear text, in signons.sqlite file; the 
password and the username are 
encrypted with the master password 
from key3.db and Base64 encoded; if 
the user does not provide a master 
password, Firefox uses a default value 
for it, [4]; for encryption, Firefox uses 
3DES in CBC mode, implemented by 
the PKCS #11, cryptographic API 
defined by RSA [25] and  the 
cryptographic library Mozilla NSS [26]; 
if necessary, the user can configure 
Firefox to use a more secure 
encryption method defined by the 
Federal Information Processing 
Standard (FIPS) 140-2, [27]; 
3. The encrypted form of the password 
and username are stored in 
signons.sqlite. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Firefox 3.6 solution for storing AutoPasswords 
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Both of these two files are located on 
the Firefox profile directory. For a 
Windows platform the profile directory 
is: 
 Windows 7: 
%APPDATA%\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefo
x\Profiles\xxxxxxxx.default\ 
 Vista/XP/2000 platform in 
%APPDATA%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles
\xxxxxxxx.default\  
 Windows 98/Me platform in 
C:\WINDOWS\Application 
Data\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\ 
xxxxxxxx.default\ 
 
This is an improved solution than the 
ones implemented by previous versions 
of Firefox, [2], [6]. Before using SQLite, 
[2], Firefox stored passwords in text 
files named signons.txt before Firefox 
1.5, signons2.txt for version 2 and 
signons3.txt for Firefox version 3. 
 
Using an ASCII editor to open 
signons.sqlite file, you can find the sql 
create command for the moz_logins 
table:  
 
CREATE TABLE moz_logins (id INTEGER 
PRIMARY KEY,hostname TEXT NOT 
NULL, httpRealm TEXT,formSubmitURL 
TEXT, usernameField TEXT NOT NULL, 
passwordField TEXT NOT NULL, 
encryptedUsername TEXT NOT NULL, 
encryptedPassword TEXT NOT NULL, 
guid TEXT, encType INTEGER).  
 
A sample record is:  
http://www.doctorat.ase.rohttp://www.d
octorat.ase.roTextBoxNumeTextBoxParol
aMDIEEPgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAEwF
AYIKoZIhvcNAwcECAExnKf8hO/BBAgu8/
xGl4o27w==MDoEEPgAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAEwFAYIKoZIhvcNAwcECN1e72k2
a8qDBBCvfgx7w+yy6BJDcPXEXSph{2a4
3307a-2a96-45ac-a79d-942de8283c06} 
and it can be interpreted as in table 1: 
 
 
Table 1. Example of Firefox password manager records. 
Field name Value Description 
id  The record id; in this example 
its value is 1 in binary 
hostname http://www.doctorat.ase.ro Website name 
httpRealm - Not used 
formSubmitURL http://www.doctorat.ase.ro The URL of the Web form used 
to authenticate users 
usernameField TextBoxNume The name of the username 
HTML field 
passwordField TextBoxParola The name of the password 
HTML field 
encryptedUsername MDIEEPgAAAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAEwFAYI 
KoZIhvcNAwcECAExnK 
f8hO/BBAgu8/xGl4o27w== 
Encrypted and Base64 
encoded value of the 
username 
encryptedPassword MDoEEPgAAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAEwFA 
YIKoZIhvcNAwcECN1e 
72k2a8qDBBCvfgx7w+ 
yy6BJDcPXEXSph 
Encrypted and Base64 
encoded value of the password 
guid {2a43307a-2a96-45ac-
a79d-942de8283c06} 
unique GUID for the record 
encType  Binary 1 value representing an 
encrypted record 
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Table 2. Firefox data management solutions. 
File name Data contained 
Places.sqlite Last visited URLs in the moz_places table 
Bookmarks in the moz_bookmarks table related to the last visited 
URLs 
Address bar input history in moz_inputhistory table  
Downloads.sqlite Downloaded files, their URL and the destination directory in the 
moz_downloads table 
Formhistory.sqlite Autocomplete form data in the moz_formhistory table; each 
record contains the form field name and its value 
 
 
Firefox saves other sensitive related 
Internet data, as specified in this paper, 
but it doesn’t encrypt it. It uses SQLite 
files to store clear text representing 
categories described in table 2. As seen 
from table 1 and 2, an attacker has no 
problems on acquiring sensitive data, 
other than the AutoPasswords, because 
the information in stored in clear text in 
known locations. For gaining access to 
the signons.sqlite data, an attacker must 
get the master password, stored in 
key3.db, used to encrypt user 
passwords. There are different 
approaches to do this: 
 Brute force by generating all possible 
passwords from a given vocabulary; 
for a secure password this is almost 
impossible as it will require a very 
long period of time; 
 Dictionary by trying common 
passwords; the attack is based on 
the user commodity and the belief 
that his password is something easy 
to remember and significant 
 Hybrid by using generated prefixes 
and suffixes with common dictionary 
passwords; 
and in practice, these solutions has been 
implemented by different software 
applications, [6-7], [30]. Based on that, 
we can conclude that the security of the 
Firefox password manger lies entirely on 
the strength of the master password. 
But, in many situations, without an 
imposed security policy, the user saves 
its passwords without setting a master 
password. 
 
4. Internet Explorer security 
 
At the time this research is conducted, 
the latest version for Internet Explorer is 
8, and despite that, a large part of 
Internet users, 15% [21], still use 
earlier versions, like 6. For this version 
of IE the passwords are stored in a 
secret location in the Registry known as 
the Protected Storage, [19].  
The base key used to encrypt data from 
the Protected Storage is located under 
the following key  
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microso
ft\Protected Storage System Provider 
and is related to the user Windows 
account. 
From 7 and 8 versions, Internet Explorer 
stores sensitive data also in Registry, 
but in a more secure way, [8] [18-19]: 
 AutoComplete passwords are stored 
in the Registry under 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Mic
rosoft\Internet 
Explorer\IntelliForms\Storage2. 
 HTTP Authentication passwords are 
stored in the Credentials file under 
Documents and Settings\Application 
Data\Microsoft\Credentials. 
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Figure 4. Internet Explorer solution for storing AutoPasswords. 
 
As seen in figure 4 the passwords stored 
in registry are encrypted using a 
procedure [18-19] that uses relative 
information for each encryption and not 
an absolute master key. Figure describes 
the encryption/decryption steps: 
1. The user access the Web page that 
uses a HTML authentication form; 
2. After authentication, if the user 
chooses to save the password and 
username, Internet Explorer stores the 
page’s URL hashing it using SHA1 hash 
function; 
3. The URL is used as a key to encrypt 
the password with strong encryption 
algorithms provided by the Windows OS 
through Data Protection Application-
Programming Interface (DPAPI); 
4. The pair-values, URL hash and 
encrypted password, are added to a new 
record in the registry 
5. The URL is not needed in clear text 
for decryption because it is obtained 
every time the user accesses the Web 
page. 
 
The encryption of Autoform data is 
implemented a bit different way [18-19] 
because instead of the URL the software 
uses the HTML form field name for the 
encryption key.  
 
The decryption process is the almost the 
same as the encryption one. The only 
difference comes from the fact that 
every time the user access a Web page 
that contains an authentication form, the 
hash of the URL is compared with every 
record in the registry on order to 
determine if there are stored passwords. 
At the first glance, the process has a 
high security level because the 
encryption key is not required to be 
stored on the local computer. In reality, 
this is achieved only if the user deletes 
browsing history from the computer 
after using Internet Explorer.  
From an attacker point of view it is 
almost impossible to guess the page URL 
based on its hash. So he will not be able 
to decrypt the registry records without 
other information: 
 the attacker tries to find the user 
password for a particular Website, so 
he compares the URL hash with the 
registry records; if he finds a match, 
he will be able to decrypt the 
password; 
 the attacker tries to break all 
AutoComplete passwords for that 
user; the additional needed 
information is found for most users 
in the browsing history data because 
it contains the URL of all visited Web 
pages, including the ones that 
require HTML authentication; the 
attacker will generate the hash for 
each URL and compares it with the 
ones in registry; for each match, the 
attacker will decrypt the password; 
because most users don’t delete 
browsing history, they are very 
vulnerable to this kind if attack; also 
IE password recovery 
software,[10][18][19] implements 
this solution; 
 
Other sensitive data as bookmarks, 
visited URLs, cookies are stored in clear 
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at different locations. For Windows Vista 
or 7, these text files can be found at: 
 Cookies in this folder - 
C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roa
ming\Microsoft\Windows\Cookies 
 History in this folder - 
C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Loca
l\Microsoft\Windows\History 
 Favorites in this folder - 
c:\Users\<username>\favorites 
 
5. Google Chrome 
 
For the Google Chrome Web browser, 
version 7 at the research moment, the 
passwords are stored in: 
 Windows Vista/XP: [Windows 
Profile]\ 
AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User 
Data\Default\Web Data 
 Windows 7: [Windows Profile]\ 
AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User 
Data\Default 
as records in SQLite database file 
formats which contains encrypted 
passwords and other sensitive user data. 
Figure 5 describes the process of 
encrypting and decrypting user 
passwords, [23], by Google Chrome in 3 
steps: 
1. The user access the Web page that 
uses a HTML authentication form; 
2. After authentication, if the user 
chooses to save the password and 
username, Chrome stores; for 
encryption, Chrome uses Windows 
Data Protection application 
programming interface (DPAPI) 
functions, [22]; the encryption key is 
determined by the Windows user 
logon credentials; 
3. The encrypted form of the password 
and username are stored in Login 
Data file, which has a SQLite format. 
 
Login Data file can be easily interpreted 
because it SQLite structure, described in 
table 3, but the password is the only 
field which has its value encrypted. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Google Chrome solution for storing AutoPasswords 
 
Table 3. Example of Chrome password manager records. 
Field name Value Description 
rowid 1 The record id; in this example 
its value is 1 in binary 
origin_url http://www.doctorat.ase.ro/ 
Log/Default.aspx 
The URL of the Web form used 
to authenticate users 
action_url http://www.doctorat.ase.ro/ 
Log/Default.aspx 
The URL of the Web form used 
to authenticate users 
httpRealm - Not used 
formSubmitURL http://www.doctorat.ase.ro The URL of the Web form used 
to authenticate users 
username_element TextBoxNume The name of the username 
HTML field 
username_value catalin The value of the username in 
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plaintext 
password_element TextBoxParola The name of the password 
HTML field 
password_value BLOB (Size: 230) Encrypted value of the 
password 
submit_element - - 
signon_realm http://www.doctorat.ase.ro Website name 
ssl_valid 0 Binary 1 value representing an 
SSL connection 
preferred - - 
date-created - Date of the record 
 
Table 4. Chrome data management solutions. 
File name Data contained 
Web Data SQLite file that contains Autocomplete form data in the autofill table; each 
record contains the form field name and its value 
Credit card data for e-payment Web forms in the credit_cards table 
Bookmarks Bookmarks related to the last visited URLs; the file has a simple ASCII 
content and uses a structure based format 
History Last visited URLs in the urls table 
Number of visits in the visits table 
Downloaded files, their URL and the destination directory in the downloads 
table  
Used keyword search terms in keyword_search_terms 
Top Sites Most visited URLs in the thumbnails table  
 
Chrome saves other sensitive related 
Internet data, but in a clear text format. 
Table 4 describes the data managed by 
Google Chrome and how it is stored. 
Except from the user password, any 
other sensitive data is managed in 
plaintext and can be accessed with ease. 
To gain access to the Autopasswords an 
attacker must gain access to the user 
machine and to the Windows user 
credentials. These constraints are 
generated by the CryptProtectData 
function, [29] implementation, from the 
Windows DPAPI, [22]. Once the attacker 
has logged into user Windows account, 
he has complete access to the 
passwords. 
 
6. Comparative analysis 
 
In an independent security test done by 
NSS Labs in January 2010, [11], 
Internet Explorer obtained by far best 
results. The study also took into 
consideration results obtained in the 
2009 third quarter and made a security 
improvement assessment based on that. 
 
Figure 6. NSS Labs malware security test – 
Q1 2010 [11]. 
 
Accordingly to the tests specifications, 
the browsers security has been 
evaluated against a large set of socially-
engineered malware examples. 
Accordingly to the figure 6 results, 
Internet Explorer has obtained by far the 
best results. 
 
Based on the security analysis of the 
three Internet browsers and a previous 
feature comparative analysis in [2], 
table 5 compares their password 
manager security options. 
Considering the vulnerabilities of each 
presented solution, table 6 describes 
0% 
100% 
Q1 2009 Q3 2009 Q1 2010 
69% 81% 85% 
30% 27% 29% 16% 8% 17% 
Microsoft Internet Explorer 
Firefox 
Chrome 
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some attack types and their success 
probability for gaining access to the 
password database. 
 
 
Table 5. Comparison of password management security options. 
Option IE 
8 
Firefox 
3.6 
Chrome 
7 
Storage of usernames, passwords, and URLs  x  x  x 
Password access via JavaScript  x x x 
Password access via software program   x x 
Password Protection not tied to Windows user 
account 
 x  
Password protection based on a single master 
password 
 x x 
Password Prompt when starting session to use 
stored web passwords  
x x x 
Easily Exportable username/password data x x  
Encrypted x x X 
Encoded  x x  
Password Manager option to "Show Passwords" in 
clear  
 x X 
 
 
Table 6. Comparison of attacks types on browser password management data. 
What the attacker does to get the passwords IE 
8 
Firefox 
3.6 
Chrome 
7 
Running a javascript/booklet on the Web form  x x x 
Installs malware on the target computer using user 
account 
x x x 
Uses XSS on the target Website x x x 
Get Windows user credentials    x 
Get URL history x   
Brute force/Dictionary/Hybrid attack in the master 
password 
 x  
Social engineering attacks x x x 
Key logging  x x  
Copies the password management files  x x 
Can use a GUI function to view password database  x x 
 
Each solution has its own advantages 
and disadvantages but none offers 
guaranteed security and their strength 
depends on how are used. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
To protect its sensitive data and to 
enhance the security of his computer, a 
user must update and patch its 
application, to use browser security add-
ons and anti-malware/anti-email spam 
software. Also he must educate himself 
not to disclose it so easy and to 
distinguish fake requests.  
Another solution is to embrace a 
Security by Isolation approach, [16] and 
use The Red, Yellow and Green virtual 
machines to separate daily browsing 
from online shopping and from accessing 
the online banking account. 
In order to reduce security risks, users 
could use additional software, integrated 
in antivirus or standalone that will erase 
browsing history and other clear text 
data on a high frequency basis. In 
secure working environments, the 
browsers usability and accessibility 
related functions are less important than 
the data security and become sources of 
security vulnerabilities. An alternative to 
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browsers password managers are the 
standalone applications or plug-ins, 
[15]. 
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